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NOTE 
SURPASSING SENTENCING: THE CONTROVERSIAL NEXT 
STEP IN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
Amanda Harris

 
Abstract 
After Crawford v. Washington opened the door to a Confrontation 
Clause debate in 2004, the United States Supreme Court has 
consistently confronted confrontation issues arising out of the Crawford 
interpretation. One issue that the Supreme Court has not yet tackled is 
whether the Confrontation Clause applies during non-capital and capital 
sentencing. While many states and federal courts continue to hold that 
no right of confrontation during sentencing exists, many other courts 
have chosen to apply a right of confrontation in both capital and non-
capital sentencing. This Note takes two new approaches to the 
Confrontation Clause at sentencing debate. First, this Note addresses 
both the text of the Sixth Amendment and the history surrounding the 
Confrontation Clause to conclude that the right of confrontation should 
apply during sentencing, or at least during capital sentencing. Second, 
this Note rejects the rationale that Williams v. New York is the 
controlling precedent in the confrontation at sentencing debate. Under 
this approach, applying the Confrontation Clause at sentencing may be 
the next logical step in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The scene in a London courtroom on April 17, 1554, had all the 
underpinnings of a modern Hollywood drama. Nicholas Throckmorton 
was on trial and charged with ―compassing and imagining the death of 
the Queen, levying war against the Queen within the 
realm . . . intending to depose the Queen of her Royal estate, and so to 
destroy her, falsely and traitorously desiring and concluding to take the 
Tower of London.‖1 If being accused of ―intending to depose the 
Queen‖ was not bad enough, multiple ―wrangle[s] ensued between the 
Bench and the prisoner,‖2 and the defendant was forced to ―call[] upon 
                                                                                                                     
 1. J.W. WILLIS BUND, A SELECTION OF CASES FROM THE STATE TRIALS 157 (1879). 
 2. Id. 
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the Crown to prove it[s]‖3 case. The Crown‘s case relied largely on 
several conspirators‘ confessions.4 At one point, Throckmorton objected 
to the read confessions and said, ―Master Crofts [another confessor] is 
yet living, and is here this day. How happeneth it he is not brought face 
to face to justify this matter, neither hath been of all this time?‖5 This 
demand for confrontation was denied.
6
 To make matters worse for poor 
Throckmorton (or not so poor if he was actually trying to overthrow the 
Queen), the jury‘s not guilty verdict was tossed out and the jurors were 
themselves thrown into prison.
7
 While Throckmorton‘s trial was not the 
picture of modern justice, it showcases an idea that dates back to Roman 
times.
8
 Throckmorton‘s case, and the more notorious Sir Walter 
Raleigh
9
 case, are both examples of an inherent desire of the accused to 
confront witnesses against them.
10
  
Notably, Throckmorton did not have the ability to confront his 
accusers, and ―[t]o be sure, the norm of confrontation was not always 
respected.‖11 While one scholar may have gone a bit far by insisting 
that, ―the right of confrontation is an American innovation, not an 
import from England,‖12 the origins of confrontation, and what exactly 
confrontation means, are still heavily debated. Whatever one‘s view on 
the origins of the right of confrontation, or whether confrontation should 
even be a fundamental procedural right at all, the history of the 
Confrontation Clause must guide one‘s understanding of the Clause‘s 
meaning and scope. Why? The answer is simple: because the Supreme 
Court said so.
13
 
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Crawford v. Washington14 spoke 
clearly; the ―Constitution prescribes a procedure for determining the 
reliability of testimony in criminal trials, and we, no less than the state 
courts, lack authority to replace it with one of our own devising.‖15 The 
                                                                                                                     
 3. Id. at 158. 
 4. Id. at 158–59. 
 5. NICHOLAS THROCKMORTON, THE TRIAL OF NICHOLAS THROCKMORTON 39 (Annabel 
Patterson ed., 1998). 
 6. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004). 
 7. WILLIS BUND, supra note 1, at 161. 
 8. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. 
 9. See WILLIS BUND, supra note 1, at 345. 
 10. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
 11. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1171, 1204 (2002). 
 12. Kenneth Graham, Confrontation Stories: Raleigh on the Mayflower, 3 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 209, 220 (2005). 
 13. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (―We must therefore turn to the historical background of the 
Clause to understand its meaning.‖). 
 14. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 15. Id. at 67. Thus, the Court overruled the Ohio v. Roberts precedent of the ―reliability‖ 
standard. Id.; see also discussion infra Section I.C. 
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Crawford holding opened a Pandora‘s Box of questions; among them is 
whether this procedural right and historical view of the Confrontation 
Clause apply during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial. The Court 
has never squarely addressed whether sentencing is included as part of 
―all criminal prosecutions‖ in the text of the Sixth Amendment.16  
Because the Court determined that when it comes to confrontation, a 
historical right and not just reliability is at stake,
17
 Part I of this Note 
takes a journey through a historical analysis of the Confrontation 
Clause, as well as a brief history of the unified trial and sentencing 
concept, which was common at the time the Constitution was drafted. 
Part I will also briefly address the textual analysis of Crawford and 
other Supreme Court post-Crawford decisions. Part II will investigate 
why some state courts have ruled that the Confrontation Clause applies 
during non-capital sentencing, while all federal courts facing the same 
issue have held the opposite. Part III explores the view of some courts 
that death is different, and thus, the Confrontation Clause applies during 
capital sentencing only. In Part IV, two original ideas are explored. 
First, by taking a textual outlook within a historical framework, Part IV 
seeks to textually answer the question What Would the Framers Do?. 
Second, Part IV also questions the precedent of Williams v. New York
18
 
in determining whether the Confrontation Clause applies during 
sentencing. Finally, the Conclusion combines history, the text of the 
Confrontation Clause, and the nature of sentencing proceedings to 
conclude that the right of confrontation should exist at sentencing, or at 
the very least during capital sentencing. 
I.  WWFD? WHAT WOULD THE FRAMERS DO? 
A.  An Unclear View of Confrontation Clause History 
―I told them that it is not the Roman custom to hand over any man 
before he has faced his accusers and has had an opportunity to defend 
himself against their charges.‖19 
The Confrontation Clause may not be as attention grabbing (at least 
pre-Crawford) as its more well-known counterparts in the Sixth Amendment 
and the Bill of Rights in general, but its late bloomer status is rather 
                                                                                                                     
 16. John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1969 (2005). 
 17. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55 (―We do not read the historical sources to say that a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine was merely a sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition for 
admissibility . . . .‖); id. at 61 (The Confrontation Clause ―commands, not that evidence be 
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.‖). 
 18. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
 19. Acts 25:16 (New International Version).  
4
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deceiving. The Crawford decision restored debate to the formerly 
hibernating Confrontation Clause,
20
 whose interpretation had remained 
unchanged for nearly twenty-five years.
21
 In relevant part, the Sixth 
Amendment states simply, ―In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.‖22 To be sure, this is a long way from early English courts where 
treason defendants often demanded that their accusers be brought to 
them ―face to face,‖ but only sometimes enjoyed such a luxury.23 
Confrontation gained some traction in Tudor England, and by the 
middle of the seventeenth century, English courts regularly ―required 
that treason witnesses testify before the accused and be subjected to 
questioning by him.‖24 As previously noted, the most notorious case 
concerning the right of confrontation is that of Sir Walter Raleigh, in 
which Raleigh demanded, ―the Proof of the Common Law is by witness 
and jury: let Cobham [Raleigh‘s accuser] be here, let him speak it. Call 
my accuser before my face . . . .‖25 While it is true, as one scholar 
humorously suggested, that Sir Walter Raleigh did not come over on the 
Mayflower,
26
 it does appear that early Americans embraced this 
Raleigh-like right of confrontation.
27
 
As early as 1647, Massachusetts provided protection for the 
criminally accused with a statute that stated, ―[I]n all capital cases all 
witnesses shall be present wheresover they dwell.‖28 Scholars Richard 
D. Friedman and Bridget McCormack attribute a more rapid 
development of the right of confrontation in early America than in 
English Courts partly to the American ―adversarial spirit,‖ which 
created a necessity of such a protection in the American system.
29
 The 
scholars also emphasize the growing importance of confrontation in the 
Revolutionary period, during which many states began including the 
right of confrontation in state constitutions using both the historical 
―face to face‖ language, as well as language more closely mirroring that 
of the later-to-come Sixth Amendment.
30
 
                                                                                                                     
 20. John H. Blume & Emily C. Paavola, Crime Labs and Prison Guards: A Comment on 
Melendez-Diaz and its Potential Impact on Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 3 CHARLESTON L. 
REV. 205, 206 (2009). 
 21. Id. at 210. 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 23. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 11, at 1205. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004). 
 26. Graham, supra note 12, at 209. 
 27. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 11, at 1206. 
 28. Id. (emphasis added). Interestingly, this statute may support the viewpoint of some 
courts that death is different. See discussion infra Part III. 
 29. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 11, at 1206. 
 30. Id. 
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In today‘s world some scholars insist that the Framers created the 
Sixth Amendment ―holistically‖31 or as a ―unified‖32 set of rights, and 
all the rights flowing from the Sixth Amendment must apply at all 
stages of the trial.
33
 Other scholars view the Confrontation Clause 
independently as a procedural right within a trial, discussing it 
separately from other trial rights.
34
 As Justice Antonin Scalia noted in 
Crawford, Abraham Holmes at the Massachusetts ratifying convention 
feared that in the absence of a confrontation clause, trials would become 
―little less inauspicious than a certain tribunal in Spain . . . the 
Inquisition.‖35 Holmes‘s concern was alleviated when Congress 
included the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment.
36
 Much 
later the Court also held that the right of confrontation extends to state 
prosecutions via the Fourteenth Amendment.
37
 
B.  Drawing a Proverbial Line in the Sand: Unitary Capital Trials and 
the Unforeseen Problem Arising from Bifurcation in Trials 
―The question of guilt and the question of death both were decided in a 
single jury verdict at the end of a single proceeding conducted as an 
adversarial trial.‖38 
One of the biggest challenges of viewing the Confrontation Clause 
in its historical context is trying to determine what the Framers would 
have done in the sentencing framework that exists today. While the 
modern bifurcated framework
39
 did not exist during the Framers‘ time,40 
                                                                                                                     
 31. Graham, supra note 12, at 210. 
 32. See Douglass, supra note 16, at 2008 (―This unified theory of Sixth Amendment rights 
flows naturally from the constitutional text, which grants those rights without distinction ‗in all 
criminal prosecutions.‘‖). 
 33. See id. at Part III. In Part III of Professor Douglass‘s article, Confronting Death: Sixth 
Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, he argues that ―Sixth Amendment rights support each 
other.‖ Id. at 2010. He insists that the right to counsel, the right of cross-examination, the right 
to a speedy public trial by a jury, and all rights flowing from the Sixth Amendment must apply 
together because the text of the Constitution supports a unified theory of rights. Id. at 2008–10. 
Douglass makes a textual argument that capital sentencing is part of ―all criminal prosecutions.‖ 
Id. at 2008. Further, since the text of the Sixth Amendment is drafted as one sentence, each right 
is necessary in ―all criminal prosecutions,‖ and thus, all Sixth Amendment rights must apply. Id. 
 34. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 48–49 (2004).  
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 49. 
 37. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (―[T]he Sixth Amendment‘s right of an 
accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made 
obligatory on the States . . . .‖). Notably, states later interpreting the right of confrontation at 
sentencing have chosen to interpret the federal Constitution, despite having similarly drafted 
protections in their own state confrontation clauses. See State v. Hurt, 702 S.E.2d 82, 87–88 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2010). 
 38.   Douglass, supra note 16, at 1972. 
 39.  Bifurcation, the separation of the guilt and penalty phase of a trial, became popular 
6
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one must still ―turn to the historical background.‖41 At the time the 
Sixth Amendment was drafted, unitary capital trials, where a jury 
determined both guilt and death with a single verdict, were standard.
42
 
As John G. Douglass notes in his article Confronting Death: Sixth 
Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, ―[t]he Framers lived in a 
system of capital litigation where a unitary trial and a single jury verdict 
determined not only guilt or innocence, but life or death as well.‖43 
With this in mind, it is easy to understand Douglass‘s theory that the 
Framers crafted a set of rights through the Sixth Amendment to govern 
all proceedings ―in all criminal prosecutions.‖44 
This history still begs the question, how could the Framers have 
drafted a clause that addresses a bifurcated trial system that did not 
become widespread until the mid-1970s,
45
 nearly two hundred years 
after the drafting of the Constitution? The reality, of course, is that the 
Framers could not have foreseen this bifurcated system, but the inquiry 
cannot stop there. History shows a few important and relevant 
observations that may shed some light on WWFD, What Would the 
Framers Do?. First, early American criminal law ―was dominated by 
mandatory penalties, not by discretionary sentencing.‖46 Second, the 
Framers were concerned with confrontation, not hearsay, when they 
drafted the Sixth Amendment because the hearsay doctrine and 
evidentiary law were not well developed during the Framers‘ time.47 
Third, the Framers drafted the Sixth Amendment in the absence of any 
thoughts of separate ―trial rights‖ and ―sentencing rights‖ because such 
separation simply did not exist.
48
 Fourth, a guilty verdict for a capital 
offense, at the time of the Framers, was usually a death sentence.
49
 
Thus, with such a historical narrative in mind, the question is 
simply: Is the bifurcated trial setting where ―trial rights‖ and 
―sentencing rights‖ are divided, simply a proverbial line that courts have 
drawn in the sand? Of course, this is not to say that bifurcation is bad or 
                                                                                                                     
after the rise of public opposition to the death penalty and the evolution of the modern prison 
system. Id. at 1972–73. 
 40. Id. at 1972. 
 41. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. 
 42. Douglass, supra note 16, at 1972. 
 43. Id. at 2008. 
 44. Id. (emphasis added). 
 45. Id. at 1973. There was also a shift during the nineteenth century from mandatory 
sentencing towards a more flexible sentencing range. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 481 (2000). 
 46. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479 (―The substantive criminal law tended to be sanction-
specific; it prescribed a particular sentence for each offense. The judge was meant simply to 
impose that sentence . . . .‖); Douglass, supra note 16, at 1977. 
 47. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 11, at 1208. 
 48. Douglass, supra note 16, at 2011. 
 49. Id. 
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unconstitutional; it simply creates an issue unknown to, and 
unaddressed by, the Framers. The answer may turn on whether one 
believes that the Framers drafted the Sixth Amendment simply ―to 
protect the innocent from punishment‖50 or whether the Framers also 
thought the Sixth Amendment protects ―the guilty from undeserved 
death,‖51 or even, the guilty from undeserved excessive punishment. 
The answer may also depend on whether or not one believes the 
sentencing phase of a trial is part of ―all criminal prosecutions‖52 under 
the Sixth Amendment. 
Finally, the varying sentencing frameworks across jurisdictions 
throws another proverbial wrench into determining an answer to 
WWFD?. Non-capital jury sentencing procedures vary; some 
jurisdictions require bifurcated proceedings, others do not.
53
 
Importantly, states also differ on what type of information, including 
prior offenses, may be introduced during sentencing; in fact, the desire 
to allow prosecutors to introduce evidence about a defendant‘s prior 
criminal history is a large reason bifurcated proceedings were adopted 
by the states.
54
 In general, ―[e]ach state‘s jury sentencing law and 
practice has developed its own individual characteristics, shaped by the 
unique legal and political skeleton that supports it.‖55 On the other hand, 
federal death penalty statutes require bifurcated ―guilt and penalty 
determinations.‖56 Further, while all states use some form of bifurcation 
in capital proceedings,
57
 others divide capital sentencing into trifurcated 
proceedings, including: the guilt phase, the capital-eligibility phase, and 
the ―balancing‖ or penalty phase where the judge or jury determines a 
sentence.
58
 With such differing frameworks, it is difficult to generalize 
sentencing issues, but for purposes of this Note, the discussion is 
predominately limited to discussing noncapital and capital sentencing in 
a general sense. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 50. Id. at 2028. 
 51. Id. 
 52. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 53. Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-
State Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 891 (2004). 
 54. Id. at 892. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Margo A. Rocklin, Place the Death Penalty on a Tripod, or Make it Stand on Its Own 
Two Feet?, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 788, 789 (2007). 
 57. Id. at 789–90. 
 58. See, e.g., Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 399 (7th Cir. 2002). See generally Rocklin, 
supra note 56, at 792–93. 
8
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C.  Confronting Crawford and Its Offspring 
―Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the 
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment‘s protection to the 
vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of 
‗reliability.‘‖59 
Courts have described the decision in Crawford v. Washington as ―a 
‗bombshell,‘ a ‗renaissance,‘ and a ‗newly shaped lens‘ through which 
to view the Confrontation Clause.‖60 Thunderstruck as the legal 
community remains six years later, it is worth pausing briefly to 
understand the textual interpretation of the Sixth Amendment from 
Crawford and the way that definition has been applied in later Supreme 
Court confrontation cases. 
To begin, one must first understand the decision that controlled 
courts for twenty-five years, Ohio v. Roberts.
61
 In Roberts, the Court 
held that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to allow the 
defendant to test adverse evidence, and developed a two-prong test in 
which the prosecutor could bring evidence before a jury by showing 
both unavailability of the witness and that the evidence bore ―indicia of 
reliability.‖62 Further, the Roberts Court reiterated its view that hearsay 
evidentiary rules and the Confrontation Clause were designed to protect 
―‗similar values.‘‖63 Because reliability could be ―inferred‖ when 
evidence fell ―within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,‖64 the Roberts 
standard became a per se rule that all but eliminated a defendant‘s 
separate right of confrontation.
65
 
Twenty-five years later in Crawford‘s trial for assault and attempted 
murder,
66
 the prosecution played tape-recorded statements made by 
Crawford‘s wife to the police.67 Crawford‘s wife was unavailable to 
testify because Washington marital privilege law prohibited a spouse 
from testifying without the other spouse‘s consent.68 Because 
Crawford‘s wife was unable to testify, Crawford was unable to cross-
                                                                                                                     
 59. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
 60. Blume & Paavola, supra note 20, at 206.  
 61. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 62. To meet the two-prong test: first, the prosecutor must show the declarant is 
unavailable and, second, the statements must ―bear[ ] adequate ‗indicia of reliability‘‖ (by being 
either a ―firmly rooted hearsay exception‖ or by bearing ―particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness‖). Id. at 66. 
 63. Id. at 66 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1969)). 
 64. Id.  
 65. Valerie J. Silverman, Testing the Testimonial Doctrine: The Impact of Melendez-Diaz 
v. Massachusetts on State-Level Criminal Prosecutions and Procedure, 91 B.U. L. REV. 789, 
795 (2011). 
 66. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004). 
 67. Id. at 38.  
 68. Id. at 40. 
9
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examine her at trial.
69
 On appeal, the Supreme Court shocked the legal 
world by holding that the State unconstitutionally admitted testimonial 
statements by Crawford‘s wife.70 
At its core, Crawford overturned Ohio v. Roberts, and held that the 
Confrontation Clause bars testimonial statements of witnesses who do 
not appear at trial, unless that witness is unavailable and the defendant 
has been given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
71
 Central to 
this decision was that the Sixth Amendment, ―commands, not that 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.‖72 Thus, the 
Confrontation Clause under Crawford is inherently inflexible. 
Reliability must be achieved in a particular manner, and that manner is 
cross-examination.
73
 Importantly, this right to confrontation ―is a 
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.‖74 Crawford was a 
profound shift from the ―indicia of reliability‖ standard created in 
Roberts.
75
 
Justice Scalia arrived at this holding through a similar historical 
analysis as reviewed briefly in Section I.A.,
76
 but he also went a step 
further by focusing on the text of the Confrontation Clause.
77
 First, from 
an 1828 dictionary, Justice Scalia defined a ―witness‖ as one who 
―bears testimony.‖78 Further, ―‗[t]estimony,‘ in turn, is typically ‗[a] 
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing 
or proving some fact.‘‖79 Thus, text, history, and the original meaning 
of the plain language in the Confrontation Clause are all essential to the 
Crawford holding. Importantly, absent, and often outright rejected, in 
the Crawford rationale are words like practicality,
80
 hearsay,
81
 
substantive reliability,
82
 and balancing tests.
83
 Justice Scalia was 
                                                                                                                     
 69. Id. at 38. 
 70. Id. at 68. 
 71. Id. at 53–54, 68. 
 72. Id. at 61. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Charles Short, Guilt by Machine: The Problem of Source Code Discovery in 
Florida DUI Prosecutions, 61 FLA. L. REV. 177, 197 (2009) (―In Crawford, the Supreme Court 
moved away from these rationales of reliability and accuracy.‖). 
 76. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 77. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–69. 
 78. Id. at 51 (citing NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828)). 
 79. Id. (second alteration in original). 
 80. The word practicality never appears in the Crawford opinion. See generally Crawford 
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 81. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (Justice Scalia actually rejects the hearsay argument by 
noting, ―[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment‘s core concerns.‖). 
 82. Crawford also notes that while reliability is the ultimate goal of the Confrontation 
10
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emphatic about ridding the Confrontation Clause of vague standards, 
which provided judges with too much discretion.
84
 Even ―run-of-the-
mill assault prosecutions‖ like Crawford require confrontation.85 
The Court‘s post-Crawford decisions largely addressed the issue of 
which types of statements are ―testimonial‖ within the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause. In Davis v. Washington,
86
 the Court determined 
that ―[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency.‖87 In contrast, statements are testimonial 
when, considering the circumstances objectively, there is no ongoing 
emergency, and ―the primary purpose of interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.‖88 
Importantly, crime lab reports that were at issue in another post-
Crawford case, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
89
 also seem to fit this 
past–present distinction90 because the crime lab reports at issue were 
sworn affidavits that were completed after the crime to prove past 
events.
91
 The Court held that an analyst is both a witness for purposes of 
the Sixth Amendment
92
 and also a person who provides testimony 
against a defendant,
93
 as required by the text of the Sixth Amendment. 
Justice Scalia reasoned that the Confrontation Clause ―contemplates two 
classes of witnesses—those against the defendant and those in his favor. 
The prosecution must produce the former, the defendant may call the 
latter . . . [t]here is not a third category of witness, helpful to the 
prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.‖94 
Thus Crawford and its offspring interpret the Sixth Amendment 
right of confrontation rigidly. ―Where testimonial statements are at 
issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional 
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: 
confrontation.‖95 Importantly, reliability for reliability‘s sake is no 
                                                                                                                     
Clause, it is ―a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.‖ Id. at 61. 
 83. Id. at 67–68 (―[B]y replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended 
balancing tests, we do violence to their design.‖). 
 84. Id. at 68.  
 85. Id. 
 86. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 87. Id. at 822. 
 88. Id. (emphasis added). 
 89. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 90. Blume & Paavola, supra note 20, at 228. 
 91. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2535. 
 92. Id. at 2532. 
 93. Id. at 2533. 
 94. Id. at 2534. 
 95. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004). 
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longer the requirement of the Confrontation Clause. Instead, when 
asking WWFD?, Crawford explains that the Framers prescribed a means 
of achieving reliability, not a substantive guarantee of reliability itself.
96
 
II.  TO APPLY OR NOT TO APPLY THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AT 
SENTENCING, THAT IS THE QUESTION 
Most scholarship on the subject of the right of confrontation at 
sentencing has been devoted to federal district and circuit court rulings 
discussing whether the right of confrontation applies during capital 
sentencing.
97
 What may be missing is some insight into why, despite 
every federal court addressing the issue holding otherwise, some state 
courts have applied the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation to 
noncapital sentencing. Since the Confrontation Clause applies equally to 
the states, it is only fair to look at what they have to say. Tougher yet 
may be reconciling recent Court definitions and interpretations of the 
Confrontation Clause and earlier Court decisions, like the heavily 
debated case of Williams v. New York.
98
 Thus, when it comes to the 
right of confrontation at sentencing, to apply or not to apply, that is the 
question. 
A.  Choosing to Apply: A Modern Trend among the States? 
―[W]e are convinced that the right of confrontation, guaranteed 
by . . . the Sixth Amendment . . . extends to Appellant‘s sentencing 
proceeding before a jury.‖99 
1.  Vankirk v. State 
The most recent court to tackle the issue of whether the right of 
confrontation applies during sentencing is the Arkansas Supreme Court 
in a 2011 case, Vankirk v. State.
100
 In Vankirk, the defendant pleaded 
guilty to three counts of rape, but chose to have a jury sentence him in a 
bifurcated proceeding.
101
 During sentencing, the judge permitted the 
State to introduce a videotaped interview of a police investigator 
questioning the victim about the rape allegations; the victim did not 
appear at sentencing.
102
 On appeal, the court reasoned that in Arkansas, 
trials are divided in ―separate and distinct stages,‖103 that is guilt and 
sentencing. Thus, at least in Arkansas, sentencing is ―in essence, a trial 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Id. at 61. 
 97. See discussion infra Part III. 
 98. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
 99. Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 428, *10 (2011). 
 100. Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 428 (2011). 
 101. Id. at *1–2. 
 102. Id. at *2.  
 103. Id. at *6 (quoting Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 412 (1994)). 
12
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in and of itself, in which new evidence may be submitted.‖104 While the 
court did not make an outright textual rationale, its findings are 
consistent with the text of the Sixth Amendment because the court 
reasoned that sentencing is essentially another trial and a defendant‘s 
rights must still apply.
105
 Thus, sentencing in this context is a part of 
―all criminal prosecutions‖ in which the defendant maintains a right ―to 
confront the witnesses against him‖ as guaranteed by the text of the 
Sixth Amendment.
106
 
The Vankirk court sided with a capital sentencing case, United 
States v. Mills,
107
 and emphasized, ―[W]e agree with the Mills court that 
a sentencing body‘s need for the admission of more evidence ‗does not 
sanction the admission of unconstitutional evidence against the 
defendant.‘‖108 Further, the Vankirk court reasoned that the weighty 
decisions made during the sentencing phase make the right of 
confrontation even more crucial and noted, ―Given the gravity of the 
decision to be made at the penalty phase, the [government] is not 
relieved of the obligation to observe fundamental constitutional 
guarantees.‖109 The Vankirk court also noted that applying the right to 
confrontation during sentencing was consistent with applying other 
rights during sentencing, including the rules of evidence, discovery, the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the right to speedy sentencing, 
all of which apply in Arkansas sentencing.
110
 Finally, the court in 
Vankirk also rejected the idea that Williams v. New York, a 1949 
Supreme Court case,
111
 controls whether there is a right to confrontation 
at sentencing.
112
 Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court broke away from a 
large number of courts that have used Williams as at least partial 
justification for refusing to apply the right of confrontation during 
sentencing.
113
 
                                                                                                                     
 104. Id. at *7 (quoting Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 413 (1994)). 
 105. Id. at *10. 
 106. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 107. 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 108. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at *9 (quoting Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d. 1115, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 
2006)). 
 109. Id. (quoting United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2006) 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
 110. Id. at *10. This opinion is consistent with the idea that Sixth Amendment rights are a 
unitary set of rights, which cannot be divided. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 111. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
 112. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at *7. 
 113. Cases that cite Williams as at least partial justification for not applying the right of 
confrontation during sentencing include: United States v. Wallace, 408 F.3d 1046, 1048 (8th 
Cir. 2005), United States. v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618–19 (7th Cir. 2005), Szabo v. Walls, 313 
F.3d 392, 398 (7th Cir. 2002), United States v. Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1060 (N.D. Iowa 
2005), State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 941 (Ariz. 2006), People v. Banks, 934 N.E.2d 435, 461 
(2010). 
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In Williams, a jury found Williams guilty of first-degree murder and 
recommended life in prison, but the trial judge imposed a death 
sentence based on evidence from trial as well as other pre-sentencing 
information, including evidence of other crimes where the defendant 
was considered a perpetrator but never was convicted.
114
 Notably, under 
New York law the judge could consider information ―obtained outside 
the courtroom from persons whom a defendant has not been permitted 
to confront or cross-examine.‖115 The Supreme Court held that Williams 
had not been denied due process of law, and reasoned that sentencing 
judges in early America, as well as in England, always exercised wide 
discretion in determining the sources and types of evidence to consider 
when administering punishment under law.
116
 
The court in Vankirk rejected the application of Williams to the issue 
of confrontation during sentencing for four reasons.
117
 First, the 
Williams Court decided the case based on the Due Process Clause, not 
the Confrontation Clause.
118
 Second, the Supreme Court considered the 
Williams case more than fifteen years prior to Pointer v. Texas, which 
applied the Confrontation Clause to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
119
 Third, the Arkansas court made an interesting, albeit 
brief, distinction between judge and jury decisions, holding that the 
Confrontation Clause applies in jury sentencing.
120
 The distinction 
between judge and jury is consistent with the Vankirk court‘s refusal to 
deem the Williams decision controlling
121
 because the Williams decision 
was originally decided, according New York statute, by a trial judge, 
not a jury.
122
 Finally, the Vankirk court made another distinction 
between the modern proceedings and those in Williams by indicating 
that a bifurcated jury sentencing may be more like a criminal 
prosecution,
123
 or at least a ―separate proceeding,‖ making the right of 
                                                                                                                     
 114. Williams, 337 U.S. at 242, 244. 
 115. Id. at 245. 
 116. Id. at 246, 252.  
 117. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at *8. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at *8, 10. It is unclear what the Arkansas Supreme Court would have held had a 
judge sentenced the case. 
 121. Id. at *8 (―Moreover, the issue as framed in Williams differs significantly from the one 
presented to us today in that Williams involved a judge and what information he could consider 
in sentencing, whereas, here, there was a jury impaneled to weigh evidence and impose 
punishment.‖).  
 122. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251–52 (1949) (―Under New York statutes a 
state judge cannot escape his grave responsibility of fixing sentence.‖). 
 123. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at *6 (―Thus, it is obvious that this new procedure [of bifurcation] 
differs considerably from the prior conduct of trials where the jury assessed both guilt and 
sentence during one proceeding.‖ (quoting Hill v. State, 887 S.W.2d 275, 277 (1994))). 
14
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confrontation necessary.
124
 Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court not only 
held, but was ―convinced that the right of confrontation . . . extends to 
Appellant‘s sentencing proceeding before a jury.‖125 
2.  State v. Rodriguez 
Another court choosing to apply the Confrontation Clause at 
sentencing was the Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v. 
Rodriguez.
126
 In Rodriguez, the defendant pleaded guilty to several 
drug-related offenses, but during his jury sentencing, the district court 
refused to apply the Confrontation Clause.
127
 The Minnesota Supreme 
Court overturned this decision and held that the Sixth Amendment right 
of confrontation applies during jury sentencing trials.
128
 The Rodriguez 
court based its decision largely on the Supreme Court‘s emphasis on the 
―fundamental and historical importance‖ of the right of cross-
examination and the right to a trial by jury.
129
 The Rodriguez court 
pointed to three Supreme Court cases that guided its decision, Apprendi 
v. New Jersey,
130
 Blakely v. Washington,
131
 and, of course, Crawford v. 
Washington.
132
 
In Apprendi, the Court held a New Jersey statute that allowed for 
upward sentencing was unconstitutional
133
 because a ―trial by jury has 
been understood to require that ‗the truth of every accusation, whether 
preferred in the shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should 
afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the 
defendant‘s] equals and neighbours . . . .‘‖134 Next, in Blakely, the Court 
reemphasized its decision in Apprendi, and reversed a Washington 
court‘s decision to give the defendant upward sentencing because the 
upward decision was based on facts not admitted by the defendant or 
                                                                                                                     
 124. Id. at *10. 
 125. Id. Notably in Apprendi, the Court acknowledged that judges maintain discretion in 
individual cases, but recognized a limitation on the judge‘s discretion. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466, 482 (2000). In dicta, the Court also noted that the Court in Williams ―held that the 
Constitution does not restrict a judge‘s sentencing decision to information that is charged in an 
indictment and subject to cross-examination in open court.‖ Id. at 546. From that sentence, it is 
unclear as to whether the Court equates the right to cross-examine a witness with the right of 
confrontation, and whether that observation is limited within the due process challenge or within 
the Sixth Amendment context as well. 
 126. 754 N.W.2d 672, 680 (Minn. 2008). 
 127. Id. at 675. 
 128. Id. at 681. 
 129. Id. 
 130. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 131. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 132. Rodriguez, 754 N.W.2d at 678. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 343 (1769)). 
15
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found by a jury.
135
 Finally, as previously discussed, the Court in 
Crawford held that the right of confrontation bars all testimonial 
statements offered against a defendant, unless the witness is unavailable 
and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness.
136
 Taken together, the Rodriguez court interpreted the three 
cases to ―establish not only that the facts on which certain sentence 
enhancements are based must be found by a jury, but also that the right 
of cross-examination guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is a core 
component of the right to a jury trial.‖137 Ultimately, the court also 
concluded that the right of confrontation is a ―core component‖ of a jury 
trial; since jury sentencing is essentially a trial, the right of 
confrontation must apply.
138
 
3.  State v. Hurt 
An interesting twist in the confrontation puzzle came in State v. 
Hurt,
139
 a 2010 North Carolina Court of Appeals case, where the court 
also chose to apply the Confrontation Clause during sentencing.
140
 
However, unlike the Vankirk and Rodriguez courts, the Hurt court chose 
to place a qualification on the right to confrontation; that is, the court 
determined that the right to confrontation ―applies to all sentencing 
proceedings where a jury makes the determination of a fact or facts that, 
if found, increase the defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory 
maximum.‖141 Markedly, the Hurt court chose to interpret the United 
States Constitution, despite having a similar state confrontation 
clause.
142
 While the court acknowledged that the vast majority of other 
state and federal courts have chosen not to interpret the Confrontation 
Clause as applicable to sentencing, the Hurt court made clear that ―the 
issue is far from outright settled.‖143 
The North Carolina Supreme Court had already applied the right of 
confrontation at capital sentencing.
144
 However, the same North 
Carolina Court of Appeals that decided Hurt had previously declined to 
extend that right to noncapital sentencing.
145
 The Hurt court chose to 
                                                                                                                     
 135. Rodriguez, 754 N.W.2d at 679. 
 136. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004); see supra Section I.C. 
 137. Rodriguez, 754 N.W.2d at 678. 
 138. See id. at 680–81.  
 139. 702 S.E.2d 82 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).  
 140. Id. at 87.  
 141. Id. (emphasis added). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 89; see also State v. Bell, 603 S.E.2d 93, 115–16 (N.C. 2004) (relying on 
Crawford v. Washington to hold that the Confrontation Clause applies in capital sentencing). 
 145. Hurt, 702 S.E.2d at 89 (noting that ―our holding [in State v. Sings] cannot be read to 
encompass the facts of this case, where the factor potentially augmenting Defendant‘s sentence 
16
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make a distinction between a sentencing jury deciding facts impacting 
Hurt‘s sentence, and their previous ruling that did not include jury 
sentencing.
146
 Like the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned in 
Rodriguez, the Hurt court provided that the decisions of the Supreme 
Court in Blakely,
147
Apprendi, and Booker ―[have] eroded any notion of 
a clear line separating trial from sentencing and distinguishing the 
procedural rights that must be afforded defendants at each phase.‖148 
The Hurt court also acknowledged that other ―courts have clung 
steadfastly to Williams,‖ but refused to deem it controlling since no 
North Carolina appellate court has cited to Williams after the Court‘s 
decision in Crawford.
149
 Moreover, the Hurt court determined that since 
aggravating factors warrant a jury determination beyond a reasonable 
doubt as required by Blakely (at least in North Carolina), then ―the same 
Confrontation Clause protections that are guaranteed at the guilt–
innocence phase of trial also apply to evidence presented at sentencing 
hearing‖ under the same circumstances.150  
Despite the uncertainty and even lack of real uniformity among the 
rationales of the to apply side of the confrontation at sentencing debate, 
one thing is clear: ―Crawford v. Washington . . . has breathed new life 
into the debate.‖151 Moreover, one question has gone unanswered by the 
final arbiters of the Constitution and that is, ―whether sentencings are 
‗criminal prosecutions‘ for Sixth Amendment purposes.‖152 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
was determined by a jury‖); State v. Sings, 641 S.E.2d 370, 372 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (―[W]e 
see no basis for extending [the ruling of State v. Bell] to noncapital sentencing hearings.‖). 
 146. Hurt, 702 S.E. 2d at 89. 
 147. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004) (―[T]he relevant ‗statutory 
maximum‘ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but 
the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.‖). 
 148. Hurt, 702 S.E.2d at 91. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 93. 
 151. United States v. Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d 714, 724 (S.D. W. Va. 2005) (holding that the 
Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing because post-Booker sentencing guidelines 
are no longer mandatory and confrontation procedural protections are thus unnecessary at 
sentencing).  
 152. Id. at 725. 
17
Harris:  Surpassing Sentencing: The Controversial Next Step in Confrontat
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
1464 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
B.  To Not Apply: Following the Status Quo? 
―Leaving Crawford‘s Confrontation Clause rule where it is found‖153 
1.  State v. McGill: A State Outlook 
Not every state court
154
 has embraced the Arkansas and Minnesota 
courts‘ interpretation of the right of confrontation during sentencing or 
more specifically, the courts‘ interpretations of Williams.155 In fact, 
many courts have based much of their decision not to extend the right to 
confrontation to sentencing (and capital sentencing) on Williams.
156
 In 
State v. McGill, for example, the Arizona Supreme Court relied on 
Williams to hold that the Confrontation Clause does not apply at 
sentencing generally, or capital sentencing more specifically.
157
 In fact, 
the McGill court read the Williams decision quite broadly, outright 
stating that the Williams Court ―held that the right [of confrontation] 
does not apply to sentencing proceedings.‖158 However, notably, the 
Williams decision did not base its decision on the Confrontation Clause 
at all.
159
 
The McGill court also reasoned that the Williams decision was 
based on a historical analysis, similar to that in Crawford.
160
 It is true 
that both Williams and Crawford took a historical approach, but looking 
at Williams and Crawford side by side, it is difficult to reconcile each 
version of history. In Williams, the Court reasoned, ―[B]oth before and 
since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and 
in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could 
exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used.‖161 
Further, the Williams Court even recognized that ―[l]eaving a 
sentencing judge free to avail himself of out-of-court information in 
                                                                                                                     
 153. United States v. Paull, 551 F.3d 516, 528 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 154. And no federal court that has decided the issue of the applicability of the 
Confrontation Clause in noncapital sentencing cases has applied the Confrontation Clause. See 
infra note 187. 
 155. See State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 941 (Ariz. 2006); see also People v. Banks, 934 
N.E.2d 435, 461 (Ill. 2010). 
 156. See discussion infra Part III. 
 157. McGill, 140 P.3d at 941. 
 158. Id. Ironically this interpretation of Williams v. New York seems illogical. As Justice 
Hurwitz noted in his dissent in State v. McGill, ―Williams was not a Confrontation Clause case. 
Indeed, under the Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence in 1949 it could not have been; the Court did 
not hold the Confrontation Clause applicable to the States until sixteen years later . . . .‖ Id. at 
948 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting). 
 159. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949) (―We cannot say that the due-
process clause renders a sentence void merely because a judge gets additional out-of-court 
information to assist him in the exercise of this awesome power of imposing the death 
sentence.‖). 
 160. McGill, 140 P.3d at 941. 
 161. Williams, 337 U.S. at 246. 
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making such a fateful choice of sentences does secure to him a broad 
discretionary power, one susceptible of abuse.‖162  
However, this is the very type of discretion that Justice Scalia, in 
Crawford, said the Framers wanted to avoid. In Crawford, Justice Scalia 
reasoned that the Framers ―knew that judges . . . could not always be 
trusted to safeguard the rights of the people.‖163 In fact, the Framers 
―were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands.‖164 Justice 
Scalia insisted that the danger of British judges‘ discretion was a recent 
memory to the Framers, and thus, the Confrontation Clause was drafted 
as a ―categorical constitutional guarantee.‖165 Notably, the type of 
judicial discretion that Justice Scalia and the Framers were concerned 
about limiting was discretion concerning a defendant‘s constitutional 
rights, not his evidentiary or other protections.
166
 Thus, the courts 
disagree not just about whether Williams applies in the case of 
sentencing and confrontation rights, but the courts may disagree more 
fundamentally about the holding and the historical approach in 
Williams.
167
 
The McGill court gave three additional reasons for refusing to apply 
the Confrontation Clause during sentencing.
168
 First, the court 
concluded that the penalty phase is not ―a criminal prosecution.‖169 
Second, ―historical practices support the use of out-of-court statements 
in sentencing.‖170 Lastly, the sentencing body needs a complete set of 
information to determine sentencing.
171
 While the court gave these 
reasons, it provided little elaboration on those points, except as to 
                                                                                                                     
 162. Id. at 251. 
 163. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2005). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. To be fair, however, the Court in Crawford addressed the right to confrontation during 
the course of a trial, not at sentencing specifically. The Crawford Court was ultimately 
concerned with constraining the judicial discretion that had run rampant under the Roberts 
standard, which allowed judges to determine which kind of statement was subject to the 
Confrontation Clause. Id. However, it is quite unclear how the Court would rule about judicial 
discretion during regular or capital sentencing. One thing is clear: the Crawford Court was 
emphatic that for testimonial statements, confrontation is required. Id. at 68–69. Notably, the 
evidence admitted during the sentencing phase of trials is very often of the ―testimonial‖ nature 
that Crawford and Melendez-Diaz outright prohibited (for instance, the testimony of inmates, 
parole officers, prison workers, or social workers). See Rocklin, supra note 56, at 806–07; 
Blume & Paavola, supra note 20, at 224–27. 
 168. State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 942 (Ariz. 2006).  
 169. Id. The court, however, provides no historical definition or rationale as to why the 
penalty phase of sentencing is not a ―criminal prosecution.‖ Thus, the court correctly points to 
textualism and history, but provides no history or textual argument to support its broad 
conclusions. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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reason that there is long-standing precedent.
172
 
2.  United We Stand: Federal Courts and the Refusal to Apply the 
Confrontation Clause at Noncapital Sentencing 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also 
refused to apply the Confrontation Clause during the sentencing phase 
because ―witnesses providing information to the court after guilt is 
established are not accusers within the meaning of the confrontation 
clause.‖173 In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on Williams 
and concluded that, ―the relevant provision at sentencing is the due 
process clause [sic], not the confrontation clause [sic].‖174 However, this 
reasoning may be difficult to reconcile with the Court‘s more recent 
rationale in Melendez-Diaz, which concluded that the Constitution only 
contemplates two types of witnesses, those against the defendant and 
those in favor.
175
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also 
examined the issue, and refused to apply the Confrontation Clause 
during sentencing, at least in part, because ―[a]s long as the out-of-court 
information relative to the circumstances of the crime bears an indicia 
of reliability, then the sentencing court can consider it without providing 
the defendant with a right to confrontation.‖176 Yet the Eighth Circuit 
gave this rationale in United States v. Wallace
177
 in 2005, a year after 
the Court‘s decision in Crawford had outright rejected that substantive 
reliability was the sole aim of the Confrontation Clause.
178
 Instead, the 
Eighth Circuit upheld its own precedent in United States v. Due.
179
 The 
Eighth Circuit devoted one line to rejecting the Confrontation Clause in 
Due, and noted simply, ―[h]earsay is admissible at sentencing, if the 
Court finds it reliable, and the Confrontation Clause does not apply.‖180 
                                                                                                                     
 172. Id. 
 173. United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005). The Seventh Circuit relied 
on Williams to draw this conclusion, but never makes clear why a case like Williams, decided on 
due process grounds, would define ―accuser‖ for Sixth Amendment purposes. See id. 
 174. Id. However, the Court in Williams could not have applied the Confrontation Clause 
because it was a New York state case and the Confrontation Clause had not yet been 
incorporated to the states. See McGill, 140 P.3d at 948 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting). 
 175. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2009). To be fair, Justice 
Scalia also indicated that the drug analyst in Melendez-Diaz was an accuser because the analyst 
was ―proving one fact necessary for his [defendant‘s] conviction.‖ Id. at 2533. One issue in the 
confrontation right at sentencing debate may be whether Justice Scalia‘s analysis of two types of 
witnesses continues to sentencing, and whether proving one fact necessary for a harsher or 
perhaps capital sentencing is akin to proving a fact towards conviction. 
 176. United States v. Wallace, 408 F.3d 1046, 1048 (2005). 
 177. 408 F.3d 1046 (2005). 
 178. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
 179. Wallace, 408 F.3d at 1048. 
 180. United States v. Due, 205 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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In the absence of any rationale for such a broad conclusion, the Eighth 
Circuit either linked its interpretation of the Confrontation Clause with 
the reliability standard or determined that the sentencing phase is not a 
part of ―all criminal prosecutions‖ under the Sixth Amendment. The 
former rationale does not seem to withstand Crawford, but the notion 
that sentencing is not part of all ―criminal prosecutions‖ may very well 
be at the heart of the confrontation at sentencing debate. 
Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
may have said it best in United States v. Paull
181
 when it announced, 
―We underscore that this cautious approach to a changing area of law is 
the proper result of following our precedent. Crawford dealt only with 
the content of what the Confrontation Clause requires and not the scope 
of when it applies.‖182 In Paull, the defendant was convicted of 
possession of child pornography pursuant to a plea agreement, and 
appealed both his conviction and sentence.
183
 The Sixth Circuit briefly 
rejected the petitioner‘s appeal on confrontation grounds, and while the 
court acknowledged ―recent developments‖ in both sentencing and 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, it held steadfast in its own 
precedent in the absence of any direct Supreme Court guidance.
184
 
Thus, the Sixth Circuit dubbed its approach to confrontation at 
sentencing as the ―leaving Crawford‘s Confrontation Clause rule where 
it is found‖ approach.185 The court reiterated that it simply followed suit 
with all the circuits that have faced the issue, and all had ruled not to 
apply the right to confrontation at noncapital sentencing.
186
 Whether or 
not the Sixth Circuit‘s ruling will ultimately win the day, it is certainly 
correct that in the absence of Supreme Court guidance, the most popular 
approach is to not apply the Confrontation Clause during noncapital 
sentencing at all.
187
 
                                                                                                                     
 181. F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 182. Id. at 528. 
 183. Id. at 519. 
 184. Id. at 527. 
 185. Id. at 528. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id.; United States v. Beydoun, 469 F.3d 102, 109 (5th Cir. 2006) (―Crawford does not 
extend a defendant‘s rights under the Confrontation Clause to sentencing proceedings.‖); United 
States v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir. 2005) (―Crawford does not extend to non-
capital sentencing.‖); United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005) (― [W]itnesses 
providing information to the court after guilt is established are not accusers within the meaning 
of the confrontation clause.‖); United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(―Nothing in Crawford requires us to alter our conclusion that there is no Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause right at sentencing.‖); United States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 243 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (holding that Crawford provides ―no basis to question prior Supreme Court decisions 
that expressly approved the consideration of out-of-court statements at sentencing‖).  
21
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III.  DEATH IS DIFFERENT, EXCEPT WHEN IT ISN‘T: THE CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE AT CAPITAL SENTENCING 
As united as the circuits may be on the issue of confrontation during 
noncapital sentencing, there is at least a fracture forming among the 
circuits as to whether the right of confrontation applies during capital 
sentencing. In fact, in 2007 when the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit rejected a right of confrontation during capital 
sentencing, overzealous legal bloggers frantically geared up for a 
Supreme Court showdown,
188
 but after the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in that case,
189
 the bloggers moved on to tackle more juicy 
cases ripe for Supreme Court picking. While the majority of circuits 
weighing in on the issue have continued to reject a right of 
confrontation at capital sentencing, the issue is far from dead. The 
reality of such a divide is that defendants maintain different 
constitutional rights based solely on jurisdiction. More confusing still 
may be why the same circuit rejecting a right of confrontation during 
noncapital sentencing found a right of confrontation during capital 
sentencing. Thus, in the absence of Supreme Court guidance, death is 
different (in some jurisdictions), except when it isn‘t (in others). 
A.  The Chosen Few: Circuit Courts Acknowledging a Right of 
Confrontation at Capital Sentencing 
1.  Proffitt v. Wainwright: A Case Ahead of Its Time 
―Because the death penalty, unlike other punishments, is permanent and 
irrevocable, the procedures by which the decision to impose a capital 
sentence is made bring into play constitutional limitations not present in 
other sentencing decisions.‖190 
Since Crawford landed on the scene in 2004, the Confrontation 
Clause has definitely gained popularity among legal scholars, but the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit confronted the 
Confrontation Clause long before it was the legal trend. In fact, the year 
was 1982, two decades before Crawford, and even then the Eleventh 
Circuit in Proffitt v. Wainwright
191
 called the right of confrontation a 
―procedural protection,‖ and indicated that the Supreme Court had not 
yet determined the scope of such procedural protections awarded to 
                                                                                                                     
 188. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Bid for Confrontation Right at Death Sentencing, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 12, 2007, 8:17 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/09/bid-for-
confrontation-right-at-death-sentencing/; see also Fifth Circuit Rejects Application of Crawford 
at Capital Sentencing, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY (Mar. 30, 2007, 7:56 AM), 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2007/03/fifth_circuit_r.html. 
 189. United States v. Fields, 128 S. Ct. 1065 (2008) (denying petition). 
 190. Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1253 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 191. Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1982). 
22
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capital defendants during sentencing.
192
 By calling the Confrontation 
Clause a ―procedural protection,‖193 the Wainwright court may well 
have been ahead of its time. Racing even further ahead of its peers, the 
Eleventh Circuit also held that the Confrontation Clause applies during 
capital sentencing.
194
 
In Wainwright, the jury convicted the defendant of first-degree 
murder and recommended a sentence of death.
195
 After the jury 
recommendation, the trial judge suggested that the defendant be 
examined by two court-appointed psychiatrists prior to the final 
sentencing determination.
196
 The doctors submitted reports to the 
court.
197
 Over the defense attorney‘s request to cross-examine one of the 
doctors who was unavailable, the judge admitted the doctor‘s report 
without allowing the defendant to cross-examine the witness.
198
 
While acknowledging that courts traditionally have not placed as 
great a significance on the sentencing portion of a trial, the Wainwright 
court placed great interest in Supreme Court decisions like Furman v. 
Georgia
199
 and Gardner v. Florida,
200
 among other contemporary 
Supreme Court cases that emphasized ―minimizing the risk of arbitrary 
decisionmaking [sic].‖201 The cases examined by the Wainwright court 
often focused on the Eighth Amendment, but the court generalized the 
decisions as ensuring that a defendant had the opportunity to explain or 
rebut evidence offered against him.
202
  Moreover, true to its post-Ohio 
v. Roberts and pre-Crawford timeframe, the Wainwright court also 
emphasized that ―[r]eliability in the factfinding aspect of sentencing has 
                                                                                                                     
 192. Id. at 1253.  
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. at 1254 (―Finally, we note . . . our conclusion that appellant had a constitutional 
right to cross-examine Dr. Sprehe before the doctor‘s report could be used in determining 
sentence.‖). Another case ahead of its time is a case from a state located in the Eleventh Circuit, 
Rodriguez v. State. In that pre-Crawford case, the Supreme Court of Florida reasoned, ―The 
primary interest secured by, and the major reason underlying the confrontation clause, is the 
right of cross-examination. The right of confrontation protected by cross-examination is a right 
that has been applied in the sentencing process.‖ Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 43–44 (Fla. 
2000) (quoting Engle v. State, 438 So. 2d 803, 813–14 (Fla. 1983) (emphasis added)). 
 195. Wainwright, 685 F.2d at 1233. 
 196. Id. at 1250. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. 
 199. 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (―There is evidence that the provision of the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689, from which the language of the Eighth Amendment was taken, was concerned 
primarily with selective or irregular application of harsh penalties and that its aim was to forbid 
arbitrary . . . penalties of a severe nature.‖). 
 200. 430 U.S. 349 (1977). 
 201. Wainwright, 685 F.2d at 1253. Notably, this type of thinking is in line with the 
Crawford Court rationale, which sought to interpret the Constitution in a way that minimized 
judicial discretion. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004). 
 202. Wainwright, 685 F.2d at 1253. 
23
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been a cornerstone of these decisions.‖203 The court thus held, ―The 
Supreme Court‘s emphasis in . . . capital sentencing cases on the 
reliability of the factfinding underlying the decision whether to impose 
the death penalty convinces us that the right to cross-examine adverse 
witnesses applies to capital sentencing hearings.‖204 
Although at least part of the Wainwright court‘s rationale may be 
outdated in a post-Crawford world, it is still good law in the Eleventh 
Circuit, even after the same circuit held that the right of confrontation 
does not apply in noncapital sentencing in United States v. 
Cantellano.
205
 While the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged in Cantellano 
the right of confrontation extends, at least in the Eleventh Circuit, to 
capital sentencing, it provided little reasoning to answer why, in terms 
of confrontation, death (capital sentencing) is different.
206
 In fact, the 
Eleventh Circuit quoted a Supreme Court case discussing the 
Confrontation Clause in a pretrial context and noted, ―[T]he right to 
confrontation is a trial right.‖207 If this is the Eleventh Circuit‘s 
rationale for noncapital sentencing, it is difficult to understand why a 
capital sentencing hearing is a trial, while a noncapital sentencing 
hearing is not.
208
 
2.  United States v. Mills: Because Death is Different 
―Because the death penalty is uniquely different in its finality and 
severity, increased scrutiny is required at every step of the capital 
process to ensure that death is the appropriate penalty.‖209 
United States v. Mills answered the question that the Eleventh 
Circuit left open. At least to the Mills court, the punishment of death is 
different.
210
 Mills has become something of a poster child for courts 
later interpreting that a right of confrontation exists in some form of 
sentencing.
211
 In Mills, a jury found two defendants guilty of a violent 
                                                                                                                     
 203. Id. While reliability remains an important component of the Confrontation Clause 
post-Crawford, Justice Scalia called for reliability ―assessed in a particular manner,‖ not 
reliability as a substantive guarantee. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
 204. Wainwright, 685 F.2d at 1254. 
 205. 430 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir. 2005).  
 206. Id.  
 207. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Richie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 208. Under this reasoning, capital sentencing would be more like a trial (thus deserving a 
right to confrontation), while regular sentencing (even sentencing where life in prison is at 
stake) is more like a pretrial hearing. It is difficult to understand why the gravity of punishment 
would affect whether sentencing is more trial-like or more like a pretrial hearing.  
 209. United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1140 (C.D. Cal. 2006).  
 210. Id. 
 211. See Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 428, *8 (2011) (―We believe that the federal district 
court‘s decision in United States v. Mills . . . to be more persuasive [than Williams v. New 
24
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crime in aid of racketeering.
212
 The prosecution sought to introduce 
hundred-page pre-sentencing and post-sentencing reports alleging 
misconduct ―ranging in severity from delaying a bed count or flooding 
one‘s cell to never-prosecuted acts of murder.‖213 
The Mills court determined that the reports introduced during 
sentencing contained some testimonial statements.
214
 It is worth noting 
that the type of reports at issue in Mills are similar to reports that the 
Supreme Court has ruled are among the ―core class of testimonial 
statements,‖215 at least during the guilt-determination phase of the trial. 
The Melendez-Diaz Court also further emphasized the importance of the 
procedural ability to cross-examine a live witness‘s ―honesty, 
proficiency, and methodology.‖216 It follows that such concerns should 
be important even during the sentencing portion of a trial. Courts must 
be concerned with the ability of a convicted defendant to confront a 
witness, as in Mills, who alleges during sentencing that the defendant 
committed such terrible and prejudicial crimes as unprosecuted murder. 
The Mills court ultimately held that the Confrontation Clause 
applies during both the selection phase
217
 and at least part of the 
eligibility phase
218
 of capital sentencing and performed an extensive 
analysis of the evolution of capital sentencing.
219
 The court recognized 
that Williams v. New York has never been overturned, but made a 
distinction between sentencing by a judge (as was the case in Williams) 
and by jury, which is required under the Federal Death Penalty Act 
(FDPA).
220
 The Mills court recognized steps the Supreme Court has 
                                                                                                                     
York].‖); see also United States v. Concepcion, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1221 (D. Colo. 2007) (―I 
agree with Mills that under Crawford, the Confrontation Clause is applicable at both the 
eligibility phase and at least a portion of the selection phase.‖). 
 212. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1119. 
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. at 1136.  
 215. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (quoting White v. 
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (noting 
affidavits ―are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony‖). 
 216. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538. 
 217. The selection phase is the phase where the jury determines whether a defendant 
should receive the death penalty. See Mills, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.  
 218. The eligibility phase is the phase in which a jury determines whether a defendant is 
eligible for the death penalty. Id. at 1125.  
 219. Id. at 1131.  
 220. Id. at 1119–20, 1122–24. The FDPA sets the procedures in a capital trial in federal 
court. Id. at 1119. The Act leaves to the jury the ultimate decision of whether to impose the 
death penalty. Id. at 1119–20. The Mills court described the six-step procedure the FDPA 
requires the jury to undertake,  
(1) that the statutory intent factor has been proven beyond all reasonable doubt, 
(2) that at least one statutory aggravating facto[r] [sic] has been established 
beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) that any additional statutory factors have been 
25
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taken in recent case law to protect the rights of convicted individuals 
who may face the death penalty.
221
 For example, the Mills Court 
reasoned that the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona
222
 held ―that a jury 
must find, beyond all reasonable doubt, whatever facts are necessary to 
satisfy the ‗eligibility‘ function of a capital sentencing scheme.‖223 The 
court reasoned that while the Supreme Court in Ring did not resolve the 
issue of confrontation at sentencing, the Court at least ―strongly 
suggests‖ that the Confrontation Clause applies during the eligibility 
phase of sentencing.
224
 The Mills Court reiterated the reasoning from 
Ring, noting that a sentencing scheme like the one at issue in that 
case—which required a finding of an aggravating factor beyond a 
reasonable doubt before the defendant could qualify for capital 
punishment—operated as a finding of an element of a greater offense.225 
Thus, a sentencing scheme that requires a finding of an aggravating 
factor to qualify for capital punishment is protected by the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury.
226
 The court‘s reasoning in Mills is sound 
because a Sixth Amendment jury right only applies if this aspect of 
sentencing is considered a ―criminal prosecution‖ for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment. Since the Supreme Court held that a jury right does 
apply, it follows that the defendant would also have confrontation rights 
guaranteed by the same Sixth Amendment, at least during the eligibility 
phase of sentencing.
227
 
                                                                                                                     
established beyond a reasonable doubt, (4) that any non-statutory aggravating 
factor has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, (5) whether any single 
juror has found a mitigating factor by preponderance of the evidence, and (6) 
―whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently 
outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence 
of death, or, in the absence of a mitigating factor, whether the aggravating 
factor or factors alone are sufficient to justify a sentence of death. 
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also discussion infra Section IV.B. 
 221. Id. at 1124–28. 
 222. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In Ring, the defendant was found guilty of felony-murder. Id. at 
597. Under Arizona law, the maximum punishment for his conviction was life imprisonment. Id. 
In addition, the defendant could only be sentenced to capital punishment if an aggravating factor 
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. However, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment, 
applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a jury, not a judge, make 
the finding. Id. 
 223. Mills, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1127 (noting also that the Court did not answer whether facts 
found in the ―selection‖ function must be subject to a jury finding). 
 224. Id. at 1127–28. The Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona did reason, ―Because Arizona‘s 
enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‗the functional equivalent of an element of a greater 
offense‘ the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.‘‖ Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 
(quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000)).  
 225. Mills, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1127.  
 226. Id. 
 227. Notably, the debate is more complicated than such simple logic because the Court has 
26
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B.  The Refusal to Extend the Right of Confrontation to Capital 
Sentencing 
1.  United States. v. Fields:
228
 Because Death is Not Different 
―Neither the text of the Sixth Amendment nor the history of murder 
trials supports the extension of the Confrontation Clause to testimony 
relevant only to penalty selection in a capital case.‖229 
The majority in United States v. Fields rejected that a right to 
confrontation exists during capital sentencing.
230
 While the Fields court 
acknowledged that Williams v. New York was decided on due process 
rather than Sixth Amendment grounds, nearly the entire court‘s 
rationale rested on Williams and the Supreme Court‘s decision not to 
overturn Williams in Gardner v. Florida.
231
 The Fields court reasoned 
that reports made by correctional officers, the defendant‘s mother, 
juvenile probation officers, the police, and other witnesses were all 
relevant in determining Field‘s past violent conduct and future 
dangerousness.
232
 Ultimately the court was persuaded that the Court in 
Williams ―was urged to ‗draw a constitutional distinction as to the 
procedure for obtaining information where the death sentence is 
imposed,‘ but it explicitly refused to do so.‖233 The Fields court also 
placed significance in Williams dicta indicating the importance of 
allowing a wide body of information during sentencing.
234
  
This rationale from Fields is flawed for two reasons. First, the 
Fields majority admits that Williams does not address the scope of a 
defendant‘s Sixth Amendment rights during capital sentencing, but then 
claims that the Williams Court had an opportunity to draw a line 
concerning procedures during capital sentencing. While the Fields 
majority is correct in saying the Williams Court had an opportunity to 
decide capital sentencing procedures for due process purposes, 
Crawford makes it clear that confrontation, for Sixth Amendment 
purposes, is a procedural issue in its own right.
235
 Furthermore, the 
Court, practicing judicial restraint, would not bring up a Sixth 
                                                                                                                     
chosen to separate Sixth Amendment rights, applying some of them during capital sentencing, 
while choosing not to apply others. Douglass, supra note 16, at 1967. John G. Douglass‘s 
argument that the Sixth Amendment should apply during the entire case would certainly 
simplify the confrontation debate, as well as make textual sense in light of the way the Sixth 
Amendment is constructed. See id. at 1972. 
 228. 483 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 229. Id. at 335. 
 230. Id. at 326–27. 
 231. Id. at 326–29. 
 232. Id. 324–25. 
 233. Id. at 326 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949)). 
 234. Id. at 327. 
 235. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
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Amendment issue not before it; nor could it since the Confrontation 
Clause was not yet applicable to the states.
236
 Second, the Fields court is 
also correct that the Court in Williams referenced the importance of 
having a large body of information available at sentencing, but the 
application of the Confrontation Clause does not serve to limit the 
quantity of information—it only limits the manner in which the 
information is to be presented.
237
 
The Fields court also relied on the Seventh Circuit case United 
States v. Roche to conclude that witnesses at sentencing are not accusers 
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.
238
 However neither the 
Fields majority nor the court in Roche provide much explanation as to 
why witnesses testifying after guilt is established are not accusers under 
the Sixth Amendment.
239
 The Roche court reasoned that the applicable 
provision at sentencing is the Due Process Clause, not the Sixth 
Amendment and pointed to Williams for support.
240
 The Fields court 
appears to have accepted this rationale.
241
 However, clearly due process 
concerns are not the only applicable constitutional considerations during 
sentencing. After all, the Supreme Court in Mempa v. Rhay
242
 held that 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies during sentencing 
proceedings.
243
 Of course, the Due Process Clause makes the Sixth 
Amendment applicable to the states.
244
 However, the Due Process 
Clause cannot be the only constitutional provision relevant at 
sentencing, particularly at the federal level where the Bill of Rights 
apply without the aid of the Due Process Clause. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 236. Notably, Williams v. New York was an appeal from a state case, where the 
Confrontation Clause did not yet apply. The decision to apply the Confrontation Clause to the 
states did not occur until sixteen years later. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) 
(applying the Confrontation Clause to the states). 
 237. Fields, 483 F.3d at 374 (Benavides, J., dissenting) (―[I]t is far from clear that applying 
the Confrontation Clause would result in ‗less evidence.‘‖). 
 238. Id. at 328. 
 239. Id.; United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 240. Roche, 415 F.3d at 618. 
 241. See Fields, 483 F.3d at 328. 
 242. 389 U.S. 128 (1967). 
 243. Id. at 134–36. 
 244. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963). 
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The Fields majority also reasoned that Gardner v. Florida
245
 was 
not a ―Williams-killer,‖ for two reasons.246 First, the Fields court 
reasoned that since Gardner was also based on the Due Process Clause, 
and since it also made no mention of the Confrontation Clause, it further 
proves that the Williams due process analysis is controlling for 
sentencing questions, even though Williams was decided pre-
incorporation.
247
 Second, Gardner did not overrule Williams, and thus, 
the Williams holding that due process does not prevent a judge from 
admitting out-of-court statements in sentencing proceedings is 
controlling.
248
  Ultimately, the Fields court determined that, when it 
comes to a right of confrontation during capital sentencing, the Supreme 
Court‘s ―death is different‖ jurisprudence is superseded by the ultimate 
precedent of Williams v. New York and nothing, not even death, can 
change the relevance of that case.
249
 
2.  Far From Clear: Other Federal Courts, Their Holdings or Lack 
Thereof 
―It is far from clear that the Confrontation Clause applies to a capital 
sentencing proceeding.‖250 
Three other federal cases have attempted to address the right of 
confrontation at sentencing, but their holdings and rationales remain far 
from clear. In United States v. Johnson
251
 the Northern District of Iowa 
in the Eighth Circuit indicated that there is no right of confrontation 
during sentencing, noting that the appellant had ―not convinced the 
court that the Confrontation Clause also applies in the final phase of 
these trifurcated proceedings . . . .‖252 However, oddly, the court went 
                                                                                                                     
 245. The Court in Gardner did note that, ―it is now clear that the sentencing process, as 
well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.‖ Gardner v. 
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). However, it is unclear why the Court would have brought up 
the Confrontation Clause on its own accord, as the court in Fields suggests it would have done 
were a right to exist. Fields, 483 F.3d at 329 (―Asked to examine what rights defendants have 
under the Due Process Clause with regard to the presentation of evidence at Capital sentencing, 
the Court . . . made no mention of the right of confrontation . . . .‖). Yet the Court in Gardner 
was asked only to examine rights under the Due Process Clause, not the Sixth Amendment. The 
Court in Gardner did acknowledge, however, that, ―five Members of the Court have now 
expressly recognized that death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be 
imposed in this country.‖ Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357.  
 246. Fields, 483 F.3d at 329. 
 247. Id.  
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 331. 
 250. United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 324 (4th Cir. 2003).  
 251. 378 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Iowa 2005). 
 252. Id. at 1062. The trifurcated proceedings in the case consisted of a merit phase, to 
determine guilt or innocence of the defendant, an eligibility phase, to determine whether the 
defendant was eligible for the death penalty, and finally, the penalty phase to determine the 
29
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on to conclude that even if the Confrontation Clause applied during the 
penalty phase of capital sentencing, the testimony at issue did not 
violate the Confrontation Clause.
253
 Why the court addressed the 
constitutionality of the Confrontation Clause in the first place is 
confusing if the testimony at issue was not subject to Sixth Amendment 
protections, anyway. 
In Szabo v. Walls,
254
 a 2002 case, the Seventh Circuit was clearer 
when holding that the Confrontation Clause does not apply during 
capital sentencing.
255
 The Seventh Circuit insisted that, ―the Supreme 
Court has held that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to capital 
sentencing.‖256 Of course, its support for this statement was Williams v. 
New York, a pre-incorporation case, and a pre-Crawford decision, 
decided on due process grounds.
257
 Thus, it is far from clear that this 
rationale would withstand close scrutiny. 
Finally, in United States v. Higgs,
258
 decided a year before 
Crawford, the Fourth Circuit essentially reasoned that it did not need to 
reach a conclusion on the confrontation at sentencing issue because the 
issue was not raised in the lower court.
259
 Thus, the court was only 
reviewing the decision for plain error.
260
 The appellant, who argued that 
allowing a police officer to testify about a co-defendant‘s confession 
violated his right of confrontation, had to prove that error occurred, that 
the error was plain, and that it affected a substantial right.
261
 Thus, the 
Higgs court held ―[E]ven if the introduction of Haynes‘s 
statements . . . during the sentencing proceeding was error, we cannot 
say that the error was plain since it even remains unclear whether the 
Confrontation Clause applies in this circumstance.‖262 Thus, the 
Confrontation Clause dilemmas contemplated and left unanswered by 
the Fourth Circuit in 2003 are the same as those that are still being 
pondered by courts in 2012. Whether a right of confrontation exists 
during capital sentencing is simply unclear. 
 
                                                                                                                     
aggravating and mitigating factors and whether to impose a death sentence. Id. at 1055. 
 253. Id. at 1062. 
 254. 313 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 255. Id. at 398. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949) (―The sentencing judge may 
consider such information even though obtained outside the courtroom from persons whom a 
defendant has not been permitted to confront or cross-examine.‖). However, the term 
―Confrontation Clause‖ does not appear on any page of the opinion. See generally id.  
 258. 353 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2003).  
 259. Id. at 324.  
 260. Id. 
 261. Id.  
 262. Id.  
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IV.  THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED: TEXTUALISM, HISTORY, AND A 
DEPARTURE FROM WILLIAMS 
Courts addressing the issue of a right of confrontation during 
sentencing are somewhat misguided for three reasons. The courts fail to 
listen to the guidance set forth in Crawford that the Court has 
steadfastly followed in both Crawford and its offspring. That is, courts 
have largely ignored both history and textualism.
263
 Courts have also 
grasped for precedent where none exists. The Supreme Court has never 
explicitly decided whether a right of confrontation exists at any time or 
at any stage of sentencing.
264
 The road less traveled, that is a textual and 
historical approach, may provide the best answer to the applicability of 
the Confrontation Clause at sentencing debate, but absent a Supreme 
Court opinion, it all remains just speculation. 
A.  A Textual Approach with a Historical Answer  
―The issue before us, therefore, is whether the penalty phase of a capital 
sentencing proceeding is part of a criminal prosecution. As a matter of 
pure logic and textualism, it is difficult to characterize the penalty phase 
as anything other than part of a criminal prosecution.‖265  
In light of the Supreme Court‘s ―fragmented‖ application of the 
Sixth Amendment during sentencing, textualism alone is unlikely to 
divulge the full answer to the confrontation puzzle.
266
 However, Justice 
Scalia‘s use of an 1828 dictionary to define both witness267 and 
testimony in Crawford
268
 at least point toward a textualist approach. 
When determining WWFD?, one may not necessarily need to invent a 
time machine; the clues to the answer may rest instead within the binds 
of a simple dictionary. After all, the text of the Sixth Amendment is not 
explicitly broken into sections, with some rights applying to a criminal 
prosecution and others not. Instead, the Sixth Amendment reads, ―In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy . . .‖ each right granted 
by the Sixth Amendment.
269
  
The same 1828 dictionary used in Crawford defines ―prosecution‖ 
as, ―The institution and carrying on of a suit in a court of law or equity 
to obtain some right, or to redress and punish some wrong.‖270 The 
                                                                                                                     
 263. Notably, the court in Fields partially relied on a historical and textual rationale but 
reached a different conclusion. See United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 335 (5th Cir. 2007).  
 264. See Douglass, supra note 16, at 1976.  
 265. State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 947 (Ariz. 2006) (Hurwitz, J., dissenting). 
 266. See Douglass, supra note 16, at 1974.  
 267. A witness is one who ―bear[s] testimony.‖ Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 
(2004). 
 268. Id.  
 269. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).  
 270. Prosecution Definition, WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY, http://www.1828-
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second definition of ―prosecution‖ is, ―The institution or 
commencement and continuance of a criminal suit; the process of 
exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal tribunal, 
and pursuing them to final judgment.‖271 An 1860 Legal Dictionary 
defines prosecution as, ―The means adopted to bring a supposed 
offender to justice and punishment by due course of law.‖272 Further, an 
accuser is ―one who accuses; one who brings a charge of crime or 
fault.‖273 
Such definitions, taken alone, cannot answer the question of whether 
a right of confrontation should apply during sentencing, or at the very 
least during capital sentencing. However, these definitions are strong 
evidence to support the intent of the Framers. After all, as Justice Scalia 
has suggested, ―[W]e are guided by the principle that ‗[t]he Constitution 
was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were 
used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical 
meaning.‘‖274 Each of the definitions of ―prosecution‖ above indicate in 
some way that sentencing is part of a criminal prosecution, and each 
definition sheds light on what an ordinary voter at the time of the 
Framers would have understood as the meaning of a criminal 
prosecution. Thus, these definitions further the notion that the 
Confrontation Clause should apply during sentencing, or at least during 
capital sentencing. 
Importantly, such definitions must be taken together with history to 
truly provide a possible answer to the confrontation during sentencing 
debate. These definitions seem to indicate that punishment is part of a 
criminal prosecution, but what does history suggest? The Crawford 
Court pointed to State v. Campbell,
275
 an 1844 South Carolina case, to 
help interpret the right of confrontation.
276
 The Campbell court held that 
a coroner‘s signed deposition could not be admitted against the 
defendant because the witness was unavailable for cross-examination at 
trial and had not been cross-examined when the report was taken.
277
 The 
court noted: 
                                                                                                                     
dictionary.com/d/search/word,Prosecution (emphasis added).  
 271. Id. (emphasis added).  
 272. JOHN BOUVIER, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY VOLUME II 396 (1860) (emphasis added).   
 273. Accuser Definition, WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY, http://www.1828-
dictionary.com/d/search/word,Accuser (emphasis added). Some courts like the Seventh Circuit 
in United States v. Roche outright declare that witnesses during sentencing are not accusers 
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, without using either a textual or historical 
approach. Cf. United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 274. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008).  
 275. 30 S.C.L. 124 (S.C. Ct. App. 1844). 
 276. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004). 
 277. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. at 131. 
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I cannot conceive how judges could have resolved, that the 
depositions of deceased witnesses, when examined by the 
coroner, should be received as competent evidence at the 
final trial of life and death- but by assuming that the 
written testimony had been taken under all the guards and 
tests of the common law, and especially those of the cross-
examination.
278
 
The language ―final trial of life and death‖279 from the Campbell 
opinion indicates that Campbell‘s trial was a capital case, and true to the 
era, the death penalty was likely ―the exclusive and mandatory 
sentence.‖280 Thus, reviewing the historical context in which the 
Confrontation Clause was applied in Campbell, taken together with a 
textual meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the historical answer to 
the confrontation question is that the Framers and citizens would have 
assumed that the right of confrontation exists both for guilt 
determination and sentencing. This is because guilt and sentencing were 
usually one in the same, and for specified offenses, that punishment was 
death.
281
 
This ―sanction-specific‖ type of punishment, especially as it relates 
to capital punishment, is relevant because it reinforces the idea that the 
people in the Framers‘ world simply would not have understood the 
bifurcated system with separate trial and sentencing rights that exists in 
today‘s world.282 Taking these historical definitions of criminal 
prosecution and accuser, together with the Crawford definition of 
testimony, 
283
 two inferences can be made. One, an accuser who gave 
testimony in a criminal prosecution during the time of the Framers was 
one who gave information, to prove some fact, and to help establish 
some crime or fault of the defendant, for the ultimate goal of convicting, 
and punishing the defendant. Two, if the crime in question was murder, 
treason, piracy, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or sodomy,
284
 the accuser 
was giving information about the defendant for purposes of imposing 
capital punishment. Thus, particularly with the regard to the death 
penalty, the right of confrontation protected the defendant from an 
accuser who was not only seeking to help achieve a conviction, but also 
a punishment of death. In the words of the Campbell court, ―[O]ne of 
the indispensable conditions of such due course of law is, that 
                                                                                                                     
 278. Id. (emphasis added).  
 279. Id. 
 280. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976).  
 281. Id.  
 282. See Douglass, supra note 16, at 2011. 
 283. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (noting that testimony is a ―solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact‖).  
 284. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289.  
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prosecutions be carried on to the conviction of the accused, by 
witnesses confronted by him [the defendant], and subjected to his 
personal examination.‖285 If, under Crawford, the Confrontation Clause 
is truly to be interpreted ―by the expectation of the Framers at the time 
the Sixth Amendment was adopted in 1791,‖286 then both text and 
history suggest that some sort of confrontation right exists during at 
least capital sentencing, if not beyond. 
B.  Grasping for Precedent: The Questionable Historical Approach and 
Applicability of Williams v. New York to Confrontation at Sentencing 
―Williams‘s notion of unchecked judicial discretion in capital 
sentencing would have been foreign—and, I believe, downright 
frightening—to the Framers.‖287 
Since many courts choosing not to apply the Confrontation Clause 
during sentencing have done so, at least in part, in reliance on Williams 
v. New York, it is worth understanding why such reliance may be 
questionable in light of the historical approach in Crawford and the 
grounds on which Williams was originally decided. 
The Williams Court recognized that the death penalty was an 
―automatic and commonplace result of conviction[]‖ in early America, 
but maintained that sentencing judges had much discretion.
288
 This begs 
the question, discretion as to what? If capital punishment was automatic 
in early America, then judges could not have had discretion over what 
evidence was permitted when considering sentencing because 
sentencing was determined by the crime, not the multitude of factors 
considered by modern courts. This is a question that the Supreme Court 
must address: do judges maintain discretion during sentencing? If so, 
what protections does a defendant have in those situations? The history 
and the text of the Sixth Amendment provide little help in the way of 
answering these questions, particularly in light of capital sentencing. 
One indicator may be Justice Scalia‘s emphasis on the procedural 
protection of confrontation and its ability to limit judicial discretion.
289
 
Another may be his indication that prior to Crawford, there was a 
failure to interpret the Constitution in a manner that achieves constraint 
on judicial discretion.
290
 However it is unclear whether Justice Scalia 
and the rest of the Court would also advocate interpreting the Sixth 
Amendment to constrain judicial discretion during sentencing. 
                                                                                                                     
 285. State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. 124, 125 (S.C. Ct. App. 1844) (emphasis added).  
 286. State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 949 (Ark. 2006).  
 287. Douglass, supra note 16, at 2021.  
 288. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246, 247 (1949). 
 289. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004). 
 290. Id.  
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Additionally, the Court in Williams recognized that modern courts 
were trending towards individualized sentencing,
291
 which is consistent 
with a modern bifurcated system. However, under New York law at the 
time Williams was decided, first-degree murder was punishable by 
death, ―unless the jury recommend[ed] life imprisonment.‖292 This type 
of sentencing was somewhat individualized in that it gave the jury 
discretion to recommend a departure and the judge the ability to make 
the ultimate decision. However, the similarity of Williams to the 
situation in early America is that the jury convicted and recommended a 
life sentence for the defendant based only on information provided at 
trial.
293
 In fact, the reports later viewed by the judge in Williams were 
not admissible at trial.
294
  If Williams had been decided in today‘s 
jurisprudence, that is post-incorporation, the information at trial would 
have been subject to all the protections of the Sixth Amendment. Only 
after the jury conviction and sentence recommendation, did the judge 
look at reports, not subject to the Confrontation Clause, submitted to 
him under New York law.
295
 Thus, under this rationale, it is easy to 
understand why courts like the Arkansas Supreme Court in Vankirk, 
chose to draw a line between judge and jury; at the very most Williams 
stands for the idea that there is no right of confrontation during judge 
sentencing, not jury sentencing. 
Looking at Williams more narrowly, it is also quite plausible that 
―Williams is simply a case setting forth the minimum requirements of 
Fourteenth Amendment due process with respect to the use of hearsay 
testimony.‖296 After all, as previously noted, Williams could not have 
been decided on Confrontation Clause grounds because that Sixth 
Amendment right did not apply to the states at the time Williams was 
decided.
297
 Furthermore, Williams must be understood in light of 
Crawford and post-Crawford decisions. Due process under Williams 
may require a certain degree of substantive reliability, but Crawford 
                                                                                                                     
 291. Williams, 337 U.S. at 248 
 292. Id. at 242 n.2.  
 293. Id. at 243 (―The judge instructed the jury that if it returned a verdict of guilty as 
charged, without recommendation for life sentence, ‗The Court must impose the death penalty,‘ 
but if such recommendation was made, ‗the Court may impose a life sentence.‘‖). At the time 
the Constitution was drafted the decision as to whether a defendant should be put to death was 
also made solely on the basis of evidence introduced during the course of the trial. State v. 
McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 950 (Ariz. 2006).  
 294. Williams, 337 U.S. at 253 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (― [I]n a capital case, against the 
unanimous recommendation of a jury, where the report would concededly not have been 
admissible at the trial, and was not subject to examination by the defendant, I am forced to 
conclude that the high commands of due process were not obeyed.‖). 
 295. Id. at 244.  
 296. State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 948 (Ariz. 2006).  
 297. Pointer v. Texas was decided in 1965 and made the Confrontation Clause applicable 
to the states. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).   
35
Harris:  Surpassing Sentencing: The Controversial Next Step in Confrontat
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
1482 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
requires procedural reliability.
298
 Thus, Williams only addressed 
substantive due process reliability of evidence at sentencing, not the 
procedural Confrontation Clause method of achieving reliability 
through cross-examination. In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, 
courts will continue to grasp for precedent, using Williams as a shield to 
protect a decision not to apply the Confrontation Clause at sentencing. 
With defendants having different protections during sentencing from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from capital to noncapital sentencing, the 
Supreme Court must draw a line. That line must be drawn with an eye 
towards history and text, and not based on a case that lacks relevance to 
the issue at hand. 
CONCLUSION: THE LOGICAL NEXT STEP 
―The Supreme Court has recognized cross-examination as ‗the greatest 
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth.‘‖299 
As discussed briefly in Subsection II.A.2,
300
 the Court‘s recent 
decisions in Apprendi, Blakely, and Crawford point toward the next 
logical next step: that the right of confrontation should apply during 
sentencing. Each of these three decisions was based, in part, on 
historical grounds, with an eye toward how voters during the Framers‘ 
time would have understood Sixth Amendment protections. In 
Apprendi, the Court addressed the historical relevance of a trial by jury, 
and the importance of determining ―the truth of every accusation.‖301 
Blakely reinforced that, ―every defendant has the right to insist that the 
prosecutor prove to a jury all facts legally essential to the 
punishment.‖302 Finally, Crawford resurrected the Confrontation Clause 
from its former convolution in hearsay and substantive reliability. These 
cases, taken together,
303
 emphasize two key points. First, these cases 
emphasize protecting a defendant throughout the course of trial and 
sentencing. Second, they do so on the basis of history. Thus, a logical 
extension of both defendant protection and history may very well be 
that the Confrontation Clause must apply during at least capital 
sentencing, if not parts of noncapital sentencing more generally. 
More importantly, in the absence of Supreme Court guidance, 
defendants have varying abilities to confront witnesses during 
sentencing hearings from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. With such lofty 
                                                                                                                     
 298. See McGill, 140 P.3d at 948.  
 299. Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1254 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).  
 300. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.2. 
 301. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 302. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).  
 303. See supra Subsection II.A.2. 
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decisions as life or death, and varying degrees of prison terms at stake, 
it is crucial that the Court make a final interpretation on whether the 
right of confrontation applies during sentencing. Until the Confrontation 
Clause surpasses the sentencing barrier, the confrontation at sentencing 
debate remains the logical next step in Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence. 
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